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Palmer: The Case for a Speech or Debate Privilege for State Legislators i

THE CASE FOR A SPEECH OR DEBATE

PRIVILEGE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS IN
FEDERAL COURTS
INTRODUCTION

The notion of legislative freedom is a fundamental principle in
the American system of government. So important is this concept
that the framers of the Constitution incorporated the common law
privilege of free speech or debate in Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution. The Clause provides that "for any speech or debate in
either House, United States Senators and Representatives, shall not
be questioned in any other place." 1 Traditionally, the privilege of
free speech or debate has not been given much attention by the
courts. However, in recent years, the application of the privilege has
been the source of much controversy.
Although the Constitutional Clause applies only to federal
legislators, most state constitutions have also granted a similar
speech or debate privilege to state legislators.' A troublesome question arises when a state legislator seeks the application of the state
1. Article I, § 6, provides:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
United States. They shall in all Cases except Treason, Felony and Breach
of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
2. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 56; ALAS. CONST. art. II, § 6; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV,
(ii), § 7; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 15;
DEL. CONST. art. II, § 13; GA. CONST. art. III, § iv par. 3; HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 8;
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 7; ILL.CONST. art. IV, § 12; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 8; KAN. CONST.
art II, § 22; Ky. CONST. § 43; LA. CONST. art. III, § 13; ME. CONST. art. IV (iii), § 8; MD.
D.R. 10, art. III, § 18; MASS. Pt. I, art. 21; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 11; MINN. CONST. art.
IV, § 10; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 15; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 26;
N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. 30; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § iv, par. 9; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 13;
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 11; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 42; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 12; OKLA. CONST.
art. V, § 22; ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 9; PA.CONST. art. II, § 15; R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 5;
S.D. CONST. art. III, § 11; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 13; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 21; UTAH
CONST. art. VI, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 14; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9; WASH. CONST. art.
II, § 17; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 16; WYo. CONST. art. III, §
16.
Compare IOWA CONST. art. III, § 10; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 17; (right of
legislator to protest action of the legislature). See also CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 11; IOWA
CONST. art. III, § 11; MIss. CONST. art. IV, § 48; NEv. CONST. art. IV, § 11; S.C. CONST.
art. III, § 14 (freedom from arrest). Only the Florida Constitution has no provision concerning legislative privilege.
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privilege in a federal court.' The question of privileges in federal
prosecutions, according to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, is to be determined by federal common law.4 The Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether state legislators are entitled to any
speech or debate privilege in a federal criminal prosecution.
This note will first examine the common law origins of the
Speech or Debate Clause in the English Parliament as a protective
measure for members against criminal liability and from interference by the Crown. The bitter struggle for legislative independence will be traced from its beginning through the embodiment of the privilege in the English Bill of Rights, to the assertions
of the privilege by the American colonists.
Secondly, the scope of the speech or debate privilege will be
viewed through the decisions of the Supreme Court. The scope was
broadly defined in the earlier cases, protecting legislators from both
criminal and civil liability for any acts within the legislative
process.' Recent decisions have narrowed this scope considerably by
making distinctions between "legislative" and "political" functions.'
A determination of the scope of the federal speech or debate
privilege is helpful in deciding whether the privilege is necessary
for the protection of state legislators.
Thirdly, this note examines the Supreme Court's interpretation
of Tenney v. Brandhove! This case has been viewed as either a
3. See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977), (state
senator resisting production of legislative documents subpoenaed by a grand jury);
United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1977)
(state senator seeking to suppress his grand jury testimony as it related to certain
crimes allegedly committed by him in the performance of his legislative role).
4. The rule states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they' may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions or proceedings, with respect to an element of
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED.

R. EvID. 501.

5. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880).
6. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
7. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss3/3

Palmer: The Case for a Speech or Debate Privilege for State Legislators i
SPEECH OR DEBATE PRIVILEGE

1979]

Speech or Debate Clause case, or an official immunity case.' If viewed
as an official immunity case, Tenney merely reaffirms a judicially
created immunity for government officials.' This privilege is
qualified and protects the officials only from civil liability. On the
other hand, if viewed as a Speech or Debate Clause case, Tenney
becomes the basis for a common law privilege to be applied to state
legislators in a federal criminal prosecution. Although the evidence
is conflicting, Supreme Court decisions indicate that Tenney has
been viewed primarily as a Speech or Debate Clause case.
Finally, an alternative solution to the question of a common law
speech or debate privilege for state legislators is proposed. The
solution balances the interests of both state and federal governments to determine whether the adoption of state law would be less
confusing, and more protective of state interests, than the application of Rule 501. As will be explained, the state interest in protecting its legislators from outside interference outweighs any federal
interest. Consequently, state law should be applied in federal courts
to determine the privileges of state legislators.
HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE
The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution
has it origins in the ancient struggles of the English Parliament
against the Crown." Originally Parliament was a judicial body
whose function was to resolve new points of law.2 A shift in emphasis by Parliament from judicial to legislative matters originated
the bitter feud between it and the monarchy," which later
culminated with the Speech or Debate Clause of the English Bill of
Rights in 1689."
8. Official immunity is a doctrine which gives government officials an absolute privilege from civil liability should the activity in question fall within the scope
of their authority and if the action undertaken requires the exercise of discretion. See
generally Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
9. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
10. See Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945); United
States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938).
11. See generally C. WITTKE. THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY
PRIVILEGE (1970) [hereinafter cited as WrrTKE]: Reinstein & Silvergate, Legislative
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973); Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and
Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecution in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Celia].

12.
13.
14.

Cella, supra note 11, at 3.
1i
The clause provides that "the freedom of speech and debate or pro-
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This shift in emphasis brought an awareness to Parliament that
certain rights and privileges had to be asserted if it was to function
effectively as a legislative body. During the reign of Henry VIII
these asserted rights and privileges took the form of a petition from
the Speaker of the House of Commons to the King. 5 In the petition,
the Speaker absolved himself and other members from the consequences of error or the displeasure of the King." Freedom of speech
or debate in the House was included in the petition for the first time
in 1541."7 It was obvious to the members of Parliament that their
freedom of speech had to be asserted against the King.
The need for the privilege of free speech had been illustrated
in Strode's Case in 1512.1 Richard Strode, a member of the House of
Commons, introduced a bill in Parliament to regulate certain abuses
in the tin mining industry. Strode had some personal interest in the
passage of the bill and was brought to trial, in a court of special
jurisdiction, for obstructing the mining of tin. The court found
Strode guilty and he was fined and imprisoned. 9
Strode remained imprisoned until a special bill was passed by
Parliament. The bill not only annulled the judgment against Strode,
but it also asserted:
[Sjuits, accusements, condemnations, executions, fines,
punishments, arrests, grievances, charges and impositions,
put or had, or hereafter to be had, unto or upon the said
Richard, and to every other of the person, or persons
afore specified that now be of this present Parliament, or
that of any Parliament hereafter shall be, for any bill,
speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters
concerning the Parliament to be communed and treated
of, be utterly void and of none effect. 20
The bill thus granted, at the very least, an absolute freedom of
speech for Strode and the other members of the House for
Parliamentary matters.
ceedings in Parliament ought not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out
of Parliament." Preamble to Bill of Rights (1689).
15. Celia, supra note 11, at 4.
16.. WiTTKE, supra note 11, at 23.
17. Celia, supra note 11, at 6.
18. I&
19. Id.
20. WrrrTK, supra note 11, at 25.
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The absolute freedom of speech was severely tested in the late
16th century during the reign of Queen Elizabeth."' At that time,
Parliament was deeply concerned with the question of royal succession, and was discussing the matter during its sessions. Queen
Elizabeth was outraged that members of Parliament were concerning themselves in what she believed to be her royal prerogative. In
order to stop such invasions by Parliament, the Queen ordered that
no further discussions of such matters be allowed. Her order did not
stop the discussions, but it did irritate the members of Parliament.
In their view it was now the Queen who was invading ancient rights
and privileges. In a final effort to end debate on the topic of succession, Elizabeth summoned the Speaker of the House and ordered
him to stop the discussions. The Speaker refused to obey the order
and the Queen was forced to abandon her attempt to control the
discussions of Parliament.2
Elizabeth made another attempt to dominate the business of
Parliament in 1571.' Mr. Strickland, a member of Parliament, was
ordered restrained from attending sessions of Parliament.
Strickland had introduced a bill in Parliament to reform the Common Prayer Book. The explanation offered by Elizabeth for her action was that Strickland had introduced "a bill into the House
against the Prerogative of the Queen."" The Queen explained that it
was for this reason, and not for any words actually spoken by
Strickland in the House, that he was being restrained.
It was during this period that Paul Wentworth made speeches
on the importance of the Parliamentary privileges. Inspired by these
speeches, the House raised such an uproar with the Queen that
Strickland was returned to his seat.' For a second time Elizabeth
had failed in her attempt to narrow Parliament's privilege of free
speech and debate.
The last major attempt by Queen Elizabeth to control the
business of Parliament occurred in 1575. A bill had been introduced
in the House concerning the rites and ceremonies of the Church.
Believing that all religious affairs were the exclusive prerogative of
the Queen, Elizabeth banned all discussions on the bill. Peter Wentworth answered this order by delivering a powerful speech on the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Celia, supra note 11, at 7.
I&
Id.
WrrTKE, supra note 11, at 26.
Celia, supra note 11, at 7.
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privileges of Parliament." The speech was never completed,
however, because Wentworth was forcibly silenced and placed into
custody.'
While in custody, Wentworth was interrogated by a committee
appointed by the House of Commons. He refused to answer any
questions of a committee acting on behalf of the Queen.' Wentworth
would only answer the questions if the committee was acting on
behalf of the House, because the House was the only body that had
any authority over his Parliamentary actions. He was subsequently
imprisoned in the Tower for refusing to testify.9
Twelve years later Wentworth was again imprisoned in the the
Tower. This time he presented the Speaker of the House with a list
of questions concerning the freedom of speech for the members of
Parliament.' Instead of answering the questions, or introducing
26. In his address to Parliament, Wentworth stated:
Mr. Speaker, I find written in a little volume these words in effect: Sweet
indeed is the name of liberty and the thing itself a value beyond all inestimable treasure. So much the more it behoveth us to take heed lest
we, contenting ourselves with the sweetness of the name only, do not lose
and forgo the value of the thing. And the greatest value that can come
unto this noble realm ...

is the use of it in this House ....

I was never of

Parliament but the last and the last session at both which I saw the liberty
of free speech, the which is the only salve to heal all the sores of this
Commonwealth, so much and so many ways infringed, and so many
abuses offered to this honorable Council ...

that my mind .

.

. hath not

been a little aggrieved .... Wherefore, to avoid the like, I do think it expedient to open the commodities that grow to the Prince and whole
States by free speech used in this place .... I conclude that in this House,
which is termed a place for free speech, there is nothing so necessary for
the preservation of the Prince and State as free speech, and without it it
is a scorn and mockery to call it a Parliament House, for in truth it is
none, but a very school of flattery and dissimulations, and so a fit place to
serve the Devil and his angels in and not to glorify God and benefit the
Commonwealth.... Free speech and conscience in this place are granted
by a special law, as that without which the Prince and the State cannot
be preserved or maintained. It is a great and special part of our duty and
office, Mr. Speaker, to maintain freedom of consultation and speech ... I
desire you from the bottom of your hearts to hate all messengers, talecarriers, or any other thing, whatsoever it be, that in any manner of way infringe the liberties to this honorable Council. Yea, hate it or them, I say,
as venomous and poison unto our Commonwealth, for they are venomous
beasts that do use it.
Celia, supra note 11, at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Wentworth spent more than a month in prison before the Queen pardoned
him and he was released. Id
30. Id
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them to the members of Parliament, the Speaker turned the questions over to a member of the Privy Council. The Council's incarceration of Wentworth was viewed as a victory for the Queen.
King James I also sought to suppress freedom of speech or
debate for members of Parliament through punishment. In 1621 he
was enraged with Parliament when it began discussions on his
Spanish marriage and the affairs of the Palatinate. In order to end
these discussions, James sent an order for Parliament to refrain
from discussing "mysteries of the State."'" James countered the
privilege of free speech by declaring that he was "free and able to
punish any man's misdemeanors in Parliament as well as during its
sitting as after." 2
In answer to James' implied threats, Parliament formed a committee. The committee drew up a report in which it reasserted the
privilege of freedom of speech." Upon receiving the report, James
declared that the assertions were "invalid, annulled, void and of no
effect."'" James shortly thereafter dissolved Parliament to avoid any
further confrontations.'
The confrontation which James avoided arose eight years later
under Charles I. Charles prosecuted Sir John Elliot and two other
members of Parliament in the Court of the King's Bench for
speeches made by them in the House of Commons which the King
regarded as dangerous, libelous and seditious." Elliot and the others
defended themselves by claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction
to judge any speeches which were made during a session of Parliament. It was claimed that only Parliament, the supreme court of the
land, had such jurisdiction.17 The court rejected this argument and
imprisoned the three."
The judgment of the court was very unpopular with both
members of Parliament and the common people. In 1641 the House
of Commons adopted resolutions declaring the entire proceedings
against Elliot and the others a direct violation of legislative
31. WITTKE, supra note 11, at 28.
32. 1I
33. Cella, supra note 11, at 10.
34. WrITTKE, supra note 11, at 29.
35. James gave as one of his major reasons for dissolving Parliament that the
House of Commons "either sat silent, or spent the time in disputing of privileges,
descanting upon the words and syllables of our Letters and Messages." Id
36. Cella, supra note 11, at 11.
37. 3 HOWELL, ST. TR. 296.
38. Id. at 306.
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privilege." Further action could not be taken until the Civil War had
ended.
This further action came in 1667 when Parliament made one of
its strongest assertions of the privilege of free speech. The House of
Commons declared that Strode's Act of 1521 was a general law and
not confined to Strode's Case. According to the House, this declaration was nothing more than a reaffirmation of the "ancient and
necessary rights and privileges of Parliament."'" In accordance with
this resolution, the House also declared that the judgment against
Elliot and the other members of Parliament were illegal breaches of
the privilege.'1 It appeared after these declarations that Parliament
was on the verge of finally securing a meaningful privilege of
freedom of speech and debate.
The end of Parliament's long struggle with the Crown came
after the Revolution of 1688 and the privilege became an essential
part of the English Bill of Rights of 1689.2 Although the privilege
could not again be denied by the Crown, it was still the duty of the
courts to decide how the privilege would be applied in specific circumstances.
An early case in which the court recognized the privilege of
free speech or debate was Ex Parte Wason. "3 The case centered
around members of the House of Lords who were indicted for conspiring to make false and misleading statements to the House. The
court, applying the privilege, decided that it was powerless to question the motives or intentions of members for any speech or debate
in Parliament." The privilege granted by the English Bill of Rights
was thus given effect by the court.
A second important case defining the scope of the legislative
privilege was Stockdale v. Hansard."5 The court established certain
standards by declaring:
[W]hatever is done within the walls of either assembly
must pass without question in any other place. For
speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prej39.

Cella, supra note 11, at 11.

40.

1

HATSELL. PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: WITH

OBSERVATIONS at 86 (1796).
41. WITTKE. supra note

11, at 30.

42.

See note 14 supr.

43.
44.
45.

4 Q.B. 573 (1869).
1d at 577.
112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (K.B. 1839).
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udice of any other person, or hazzardous to the public
peace, that member enjoys complete impunity. For any
paper signed by the Speaker, by order of the House,
though to the last degree calumnious, or even if it brought
personal suffering upon individuals, the Speaker cannot be
arraigned in a court of Justice."
The importance of the privilege evidently was not lost on this court.
Neither was it lost on the American Colonists.
Foundations of the Privilege in America
The speech or debate privilege was not as secure in America
during the colonial years as it had been in England. The colonists
were often confronted with conflicts between their legislative
assemblies and the royal governors. There were also many conflicts
between the assemblies and Parliament.'7 The members of the
assemblies contended that they possessed some judicial and
legislative powers. Parliament, on the other hand, maintained that it
alone was vested with such powers.'8 In Parliament's view, the
assemblies needed no speech or debate privilege because they had
no real power.
The colonists gained experience through these conflicts and
also through the history of the struggle for the speech or debate
privilege in England. Three early state constitutions contained
clauses guaranteeing freedom of speech or debate in the state
legislatures even before the United States Constitution was
written.'9 The primary reason for these clauses was explained by
James Wilson.' Emphasizing the importance of a legislator's public
duty, Wilson wrote:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy
the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence."
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1156.
Celia, supra note 11, At 13-14.

I&
49. Maryland Declaration of Rights 1776, Constitution of the State of
Massachusetts of 1780, and the Constitution of New Hampshire of 1784.
50. James Wilson was a member of the committee that drafted the Speech or
Debate Clause for the United States Constitution.
51. II WORKS OF JAMES WILSON at 38 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
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In addition to the clauses in the state constitutions, a clause very
similar to the one in the English Bill of Rights was adopted for the
United States Constitution without opposition.52
The freedom which the framers of the Constitution sought to
protect was abridged in Matthew Lyon's Case.51 Matthew Lyon was
an anti-Federalist Congressman from Vermont who was the first
man prosecuted under the Sedition Act of 1798." The indictment
against Lyon was for publishing two letters critical of the Adams
administration. The first letter accused the President of an "unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation and selfish
avarice." The second letter charged the administration with
"stupidity" in its policy towards France.5 Lyon was brought to trial for
these letters just six days after a grand jury had been impanelled
to look into the matter. The Speech or Debate Clause was not raised
by Lyon in his defense.5 He was sentenced to four months in prison
5
and was also fined $1,000. 1
52. William Pinckney proposed that each House be the sole and exclusive
judge of the privilege. James Madison proposed that the extent of the privilege be
delineated. Neither proposal gained enough support to be accepted. See J. BUTZNER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHAFF at

47 (1941).

53.

15 F. Cas. 1183 (D. Vt. 1798).

54.

I

STAT.

543 (1798).

55. This letter, allegedly from a diplomat in France, read as follows:
The misunderstanding between the two governments (France and the
United States), has become extremely alarming; confidence is completely
destroyed, mistrusts, jealousy, and a disposition to a wrong attribution of
motives, are so apparent, as to require the utmost caution in every word
and action that are to come from your executive. I mean, if your object is
to avoid hostilities. Had this truth been understood with you before the
recall of Monroe, before the coming and second coming of Pinckney; had it
guided the pens that wrote the bullying speech of your president, and
stupid answer of your senate, at the opening of congress in November
last, I should probably had no occasion to address you this letter.- But
when we found him borrowing the language of Edmund Burke, and telling
the world that although he should succeed in treating with the French,
there was no dependence to be placed on any of their engagements, that
their religion and morality were at an end, that they would turn pirates
and plunderers, and it would be necessary to be perpetually armed
against them, though you were at peace: we wondered that the answer of
both houses had not been an order to send him to a mad house. Instead of
this the senate have echoed the speech with more servility than George
III experienced from either house of parliament.
15 F. Cas. at 1184.
56. Lyon's attorney had been the Chief Justice of Vermont, but he withdrew
,from the case when he was refused adequate time to prepare a defense. Although
Lyon defended himself, he had little knowledge of the procedures of the court. It is
likely that Lyon never knew that he may have been protected by the Speech or
Debate Clause. Id. at 1185.
57. 1l
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While Lyon was in prison his constituents re-elected him." He
was hailed as a hero of the people for speaking his mind and criticizing the President. 9 Lyon's imprisonment so embarrassed the Adams
administration "that the cabinet panted for an excuse to liberate
him."" Lyon was offered a pardon in return for his apology,"' but he
refused and served his entire sentence." Final satisfaction came in 1840
when a bill was passed in both Houses of Congress which voided
the judgment against Lyon."
Matthew Lyon's Case illustrates the importance of a legislative
privilege to be free from criminal liability. Legislators must be free
to represent their constituents without fear of reprisals from anyone
outside of the legislature. The Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution granted free speech or debate to federal legislators. As it
had been in England, it was the duty of the American courts to
define the scope of the federal privilege.
SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN PRIVILEGE

An examination of the scope of the speech or debate privilege,
through past court decisions, demonstrates the considerations which
make the Clause indispensable to federal legislators. These considerations, however, must be reviewed to determine whether they
also apply to state legislators. If they do apply, state legislators
should be granted a common law speech or debate privilege which
could be invoked in a federal criminal prosecution.
Although not involving federal legislators, the first American
decision to explore the scope of a state speech or debate privilege
was Coffin v. Coffin." William Coffin asked Bejamin Russell, a
Massachusetts legislator, to introduce a bill authorizing the appointment of an additional Notary Public for Nantucket. After the House
had considered the bill and had passed on'to other matters, Micajah
Coffin," another state legislator, asked Russell where he had received
his information concerning the bill. When told that it had been from
William, Micajah replied, "What, that convict?"" referring to an inci58. Id. at 1190.
59. J. SMITH. FREEDOM'S FETTERS at 241 (1956).
60. 15 F. Cas. at 1189.
61. Id. at 1190.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1191.
64. 4 Mass. 1 (1880).
65. William Coffin and Micajah Coffin were not related.
66. Russell told Micajah that William had been aquitted, to which Micajah
replied, "That does not make him the less guilty." 4 Mass. at 2.
1
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dent in which William had been acquitted for the robbery of the
Nantucket Bank. William subsequently brought a suit against Micajah for slander.
Micajah raised the Speech or Debate Clause of the Massachusetts Constitution 7 as a defense to William's slander charge. In
the decision of the court, the scope of the clause was extended to encompass any "opinion, speech, debate, vote, written report" and "to
every other act resulting from the nature and execution of the office."" These actions were protected whether they were proper or
improper in regard to the rules of the House. The only restriction
was that the House had to be in session."
Subsequently the court ignored its own broad interpretation
and ruled very narrowly that Micajah's words were not within the
discharge of his official duty." The slanderous remarks were therefore not protected by the privilege. 1 Later decisions, however, were
influenced more by the dicta of Coffin than by its narrow ruling.
The United States Supreme Court utilized the broad
2
phraseology of Coffin in Kilbourn v. Thompson."
The action in
Kilbourn was against members of a Congressional committee and
the sergeant-at-arms for false imprisonment. The committee subpoenaed Kilbourn to testify in an investigation of an illegal real
estate pool. Kilbourn refused to answer any questions or to produce
certain articles requested by the committee. The committee
members then passed a resolution and ordered Thompson, the
sergeant-at-arms, to arrest and imprison Kilbourn for contempt of
the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court held that the
order to arrest Kilbourn was unconstitutional."' In response to the
members' defense of the Speech or Debate Clause, it was held that
the protection of the Clause should be extended to written reports,
resolutions, voting, and "in short to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it."7' The voting on the resolution to arrest Kilbourn was
67. "The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the
legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people that it cannot be the foundation
of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." MASS. Pt. I, art. 21.
68. 4 Mass. at 27.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 30.
71. Id. at 36.
72. 103 U.S. at 168 (1880).
73. Id. at 182.
74. Id. at 204.
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therefore protected by the Speech or Debate Clause and the Court
could not fix liability on the committee members."5
However Kilbourn was not without relief. The Court also ruled
that Thompson, being only an employee of the House, was not protected by the Clause." In following the unconstitutional orders of
the committee, Thompson was subject to liability for false imprisonment. The decision left open the question of whether Kilbourn would
have had any remedy had a Congressman, and not the sergeant-atarms, arrested and imprisoned him. The Court concluded that it was
"not necessary to decide here that there may not be things done in
one House or the other of an extraordinary character for which
members who take part in the act may be held legally responsible."
The scope of the Speech or Debate Clause thus remained unclear
even after the decision in Kilbourn.
The next opportunity to clarify the scope of the Clause did not
5
occur until some seventy years later in Tenney v. Brandhove.1
The
case concerned the alleged violation of a citizen's civil rights by the
California Senate Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities. Brandhove had circulated a petition attempting to persuade
the California Legislature to deny further appropriations for the
committee. Shortly thereafter Brandhove was summoned to testify
before the committee. He refused to testify, alleging that the hearing was not held for a legislative purpose but was designed to "intimidate and silence [him] and deter and prevent him from effectively
exercising his Constitutional rights of free speech."79 Brandhove
later brought a suit based on 8 U.S.C. Sections 4310 and 47(3).81 The
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id
Id at 205.
Id at 204.
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Id at 371.
8 U.S.C. § 43 is now found at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The section provides

that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id (emphasis added).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) is now found at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976). The section
states:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
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district judge dismissed the action without an opinion, 2 but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the complaint
did state a cause of action against the committee and its members."
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certioraribecause of the important issues raised concerning the rights of individuals and the
power of state legislatures."
The Court assumed that the state legislators were protected by
a legislative privilege.8 However, the Court did not discuss the
origin of the state legislators' privilege. It is obvious that the
Supreme Court could not have invoked the Speech or Debate Clause
because it applies only to federal legislators. The state legislators
also could not have been protected by a state speech and debate
clause because, at the time the case was brought, the California Constitution contained no such clause. Therefore, some form of common
law legislative privilege must have been applied.
The main issue in Tenney, according to the Court, was not
whether a legislative privilege existed but whether Congress had intended to overturn that privilege by the enactment of 8 U.S.C. Sections 43 and 47. The Court retraced the history of the federal
Speech or Debate Clause and concluded that Congress could not
have meant to overturn a "tradition so well grounded in history and
reason."' The Court speculated:

lId

depriving, either directly or indirectly any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by
force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote
from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor
of the election of any qualified person as an elector for President or VicePresident or as a Member of the Congress of the United States; or to injure- any citizen in person or property on account of such support; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of
such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for
the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation against
any one or more of the conspirators.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

341 U.S. at 371.
Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1950).
340 U.S. 903 (1950).
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
Id at 376.
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Let us assume, merely for the moment that Congress has
Constitutional powers to limit the freedom of State
legislators acting within their traditional sphere. That
would be a big assumption. But we would have to make an
even rasher assumption to find Congress thought it had
exercised the power."
Implicit in this judicial statement is the idea that if Congress could
limit the freedom of state legislators at all, it would have to do so
through a very narrowly drafted statute. Whatever the origin of the
privilege granted to the California state legislators, it was clear that
they were protected from civil liability for violation of the broad
statutes involved in that case.
The question of civil liability having been settled, the next major problem was the applicability of the federal speech or debate
privilege in the criminal context. Although the privilege as it
originally existed in England was used primarily to protect
members of Parliament from criminal prosecutions, United States v.
Johnson" was the first case in which the Supreme Court was asked
to apply the privilege in a criminal prosecution. Johnson, a former
United States Congressman from Maryland, was indicted for a violation of the federal conflict of interest rule" and for conspiracy to
defraud the United States." The government alleged that Johnson
received substantial campaign contributions from a loan company as
a result of making a speech which was favorable to independent savings and loan associations. The government further alleged that the
contributions were also a payment to Johnson for his attempt to
persuade the Department of Justice to review pending indictments
against a loan company and its officers for mail fraud. These campaign contributions were never reported to the Department of
Justice. Congressman Johnson raised the Speech or Debate Clause
as a defense to some of these allegations.
No argument was made that the attempt to influence the
Department of Justice was protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause. It was obvious that this action was in no way related to the
functioning of the legislative process. 1 However, in trying to prove
the allegations concerning the speech made by Johnson, the government questioned the former congressman as to how much of the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
383 U.S. 169 (1966).
18 U.S.C. § 281 (repealed 1962).
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
383 U.S. at 172.
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speech was written by him; how much was written by his administrative assistant; and how much was written by outsiders
representing the loan companies. The government also questioned
Johnson's personal knowledge of the factual material included in the
speech and his motives for delivering the speech. Johnson claimed
that these questions should be barred by the Speech or Debate
Clause.
Tracing the history of the Speech or Debate Clause, the
Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he legislative privilege, protecting
against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the 'practical
security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature."" This
privilege was to include not only legislative acts, but also the
motives for those acts. 3 The case was remanded to the district court
to allow the government to pursue the conspiracy charge without
questioning the motive of Congressman Johnson for making the
speech, nor the manner in which the speech was prepared. 4 This interpretation of the Clause was the most liberal yet to be expounded
by the Court.
In more recent years, however, the liberal construction of the
Clause has been considerably narrowed by the Court. In United
States v. Brewster," for example, the Court held the privilege to be
inapplicable even though the facts of the case were very similar to
those in Johnson. Congressman Brewster was indicted for accepting
a bribe." The majority ruled that the crime charged in Brewster
was complete when the Congressman actually accepted the money in
exchange' for his promise to act in a certain manner." The actual
performance, according to the decision, need not be shown. No inquiry into any legislative act or motivation for any legislative act
was necessary to establish the crime.
The majority drew a distinction between legislative acts and
political acts. Political acts were, in effect, errands for constituents
and were outside the protection of the Clause. These acts included
92.
I at 179.
93. Id at 183-84.
94. Id. at 186. On remand, the district court dismissed the conspiracy count
without objection from the government. Johnson was found guilty on the remaining
counts. The decision was affirmed in the Circuit Court. See United States v. Johnson,
419 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1969).
95. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
96. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(cXl)-(2) (1976).
97. 408 U.S. at 526.
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making appointments to government agencies, assisting constituents
in securing government contracts, preparing newsletters for constituents, making press releases, making speeches outside of Congress,
and a variety of other acts which have come to be expected by constituents. 8 Such acts were "political" because they were merely
casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs and not a part
of the legislative process itself."
The Supreme Court elaborated further on the politicallegislative distinction in yet another criminal prosecution, Gravel v.
United States.1 0° Senator Gravel convened a meeting of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee. At this meeting he read into the record a large portion of
the Pentagon Papers."' Gravel then placed the entire forty-seven
volumes of the report into the public record. Press reports later
revealed that Gravel had also made arrangements for the private
publication of the report by Beacon Press."2 A grand jury was convened to investigate the possible criminal conduct of Senator Gravel
in regard to these activities. 13 Subpoenas were served on the publisher of Beacon Press and members of Gravel's staff. Gravel, as an
intervenor, made a motion to quash the subpoenas'" on the ground
that they violated the Speech or Debate Clause by compelling his
aides to testify to matters pertaining to the preparation of the sub05
committee's meeting.
98. Id. at 512.
99. Id. On the other hand, legislative acts are those things "generally done in
a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it ..
Id (cite omitted).
100. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
101. The report, entitled "History of the United States' Decision-Making Process in Viet Nam Policy," was given a Defense Department security classification of
"Top Secret-Sensitive."
102. There was evidence that the publication of the report would not be a profit making venture for Senator Gravel. 408 U.S. at 634.
103. The crimes being investigated were the retention of public property with
intent to convert (18 U.S.C. § 641), the gathering and transmitting of national defense
information (18 U.S.C. § 793), the concealment or removal of public records or
documents (18 U.S.C. § 2071), and conspiracy to commit such offenses and to defraud
the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371). Id. at 608.
104. The Court of Appeals in United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 756-757 (lst
Cir. 1972), held that because the subpoena was directed to third parties who could not
be counted on to risk contempt to protect the intervenor's rights, people such as
Senator Gravel might be "powerless to avert the mischief of the order" if they were
not allowed to appeal the subpoena as an intervenor. See also Perlman v. United
States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1917).
105. The question of whether a Senator's aides could invoke the Speech or
Debate Clause had never before been presented to the Court. The Court ruled that
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The majority held that matters pertaining to the preparation of
the subcommittee's meeting were not legislative acts and were not
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. The only legislative act
recognized by the Court was the placement of the report into the
public record. Gravel or his aide could therefore be questioned as to
the sources of the classified material, as long as the legislative act
itself was not brought into question. The Court also ruled that it
would allow questioning "as it proves relevant to investigating
possible third-party crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal,
performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the course of their
employment, in preparation for the subcommittee hearing."'0 ° The
third party crime in this case was the plan of Beacon Press to
publish and distribute the Pentagon Papers.
Senator Gravel contended that the private publication and
distribution of the report was within his legislative function and
should be protected by the Clause. Gravel maintained that in order
to be an effective legislator he must be allowed to inform his constituents of the actions of the executive branch. This flow of information was necessary in order for the constituents to form intelligent
opinions and to inform the Senator of those opinions. The informing
function was thus an essential element of the legislative functioning.
The majority of the Court disagreed with Gravel, holding that such
an informing function was merely political and not protected by the
Clause."0 7 The informing function was viewed as an important element, but not an absolutely necessary ingredient of the legislative
process.1°8
The Supreme Court began with a very broad interpretation of
legislative privilege, extending its protection to both state and
federal legislators in civil suits and to federal legislators in criminal
cases. However the Court has consistently narrowed the scope of
the privilege in recent years. This has been done primarily by making a distinction between political and legislative activities. Political
activities, such as appointments to government agencies and press
releases, are merely tangentially related to the job of legislating and
since the aides were indispensible to the Senator in the performance of his duties,
their acts should be privileged to the same extent that the acts would have been
privileged had they been performed by the Senator himself. 408 U.S. at 621-22.
106. Id at 629.
107. Id at 625.
108. Id For a discussion on how this ruling might undermine the power of the
legislature, see Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional
Independence. 59 VA. L. REV. 175 (1973).
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are not privileged. On the other hand legislative activities, which include the actual voting on and debating of issues, are protected.
These activities are the essential actions of legislators. A question
yet to be decided by the Supreme Court is whether these legislative
activities, when performed by a state legislator, are privileged in a
federal criminal prosecution.
DECISIONS ON A SPEECH OR DEBATE PRIVILEGE FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

United States v. Craig'" offered the federal courts their first
opportunity to determine whether a state legislator is protected by
any speech or debate privilege in a federal criminal prosecution. In
this case, Illinois state legislators were indicted for violations of the
Hobbs Act"' and the Mail Fraud Act."' Defendant Markert was subpoenaed by a grand jury. In his testimony Markert answered all
questions put to him without raising the question of legislative
privilege." 2
During the district court trial, Markert moved to suppress his
grand jury testimony by raising both the state and federal Speech or
109. 528 F.2d 773 (1976).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a) (1976). The Hobbs Act provides that:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The Mail Fraud Act states that:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure
for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be
such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered
by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
112. 528 F.2d at 774.
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Debate Clauses."' The district court, accepting Markert's argument
only in regard to the state privilege, dismissed the action. On appeal, however, a panel decision of the Seventh Circuit held that the
state speech or debate clause could not be applied in a federal
criminal prosecution because both Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Pr~cedure," and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence' " mandate that the application of privileges in the federal
courts are to be determined by the principles of common law in the
light of reason and experience." 6 As to the federal speech or debate
privilege, the court found that it protected only federal legislators
and could not be extended to state legislators. In view of the federal
rules however, the court looked to past Supreme Court decisions to
find a common law speech or debate privilege that could be applied
to state legislators in the federal courts."'
The court found such a common law speech or debate privilege in
past decisions." 8 The panel, however, went further than the Tenney
Court in explaining the reason for the privilege. According to the
decision, state legislators, when acting within the scope of their
powers, perform a vital role in the American system of government."' This vital role was anticipated by the framers of the Constitution when they granted the states all powers not enumerated
among the powers of the federal government.' The court reasoned
that, in light of the importance of state legislatures, it is essential
that the members be able to discharge their duties free from any
undue influence. The United States Attorney General admitted at
oral argument that state legislators may be influenced by threats of
federal criminal prosecutions. " The opinion concluded that the
speech or debate privilege was a basic tenet of our system of
government and that state legislators should be granted a common
113. Article 4, Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution provides that: "A member [of the General Assembly] shall not be held to answer before any other tribunal for
any speech or debate, written or oral, in either house .... " ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
114. "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open
court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
115. See note 4 supra.
116. 528 F.2d at 776.
117. Id.
118.
d. at 779.
119. Id. at 778.
120. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution states that: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
121. 528 F.2d at 778-79.
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law privilege applicable in federal courts, in criminal as well as civil
proceedings. 12
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tone reasoned that the Tenney
decision did not extend a speech or debate privilege to members of
state legislatures, but merely reaffirmed the judicially created doctrine of official immunity.2 3 Because official immunity only insulates
officials from civil liability, the opinion stated that Markert had no
privilege protecting him from criminal liability.
Judge Tone viewed the speech or debate privilege as a means
to ensure a separation of powers.12 4 Under this view, protection from
criminal liability is necessary only when there are equal governmental units involved and one branch must be protected from any abuse
of power by the other branches. The concurring opinion stated that
due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,' 1 there was no
separation of powers problem between a state legislature and the
federal government. Therefore, state legislators need not be protected from a federal criminal prosecution. The ruling of the panel
providing for a common law speech or debate privilege for state
legislators in federal courts was overturned when Judge Tone's concurring opinion was accepted as the decision of the court when the
case was reheard en banc."
The question of a common law speech or debate privilege also
arose in the Third Circuit in In-Re Grand Jury Proceedings." The
case concerned a grand jury investigation of a Pennsylvania state
senator for criminal conduct." The state senator was subpoenaed
and directed to produce documents, some of which were directly
122. Id at 779.
123. Id at 782.
124. Id. at 783.
125. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Law of any State to the Contary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
126. 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976). To avoid confusion, Judge Tone's decision will
be referred to as the "concurring opinion" in 528 F.2d 773, throughout the remainder
of this note.
127. 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
128. The grand jury was investigating allegations of mail fraud, racketeering
and tax evasion. Id. at 579.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979

522

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1979], Art. 3
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol.13

related to his legislative functions. 1" The senator resisted the production of these materials by invoking the Speech or Debate Clause
of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions."
The district court held that the clauses were not applicable to a
state legislator in a federal criminal prosecution. However, the court
did decide that there was a common law speech or debate privilege
that could be invoked.13 On the court's suggestion, the government
amended its list of subpoenaed documents. 2 On appeal the Third
Circuit affirmed this decision. However, the court in In Re Grand
Jury Proceedings did not base its decision on Tenney as did the
panel decision in Craig. In fact the Third Circuit agreed with the
concurring opinion in that case, saying that Tenney merely reaffirmed
the doctrine of official immunity as applied to legislative officers.'"
However, the court did base a common law speech or debate privilege on the importance of the role of state legislators and their need
129. The subpoenaed Senate Majority Appropriations Committee documents
included:
(1) The Committee budget for each year, including the breakdown of expenditures.
(2) All audits, formal or informal, performed on the Committee.
(3) All payroll records, including but not limited to, a list by name and address of employees or individuals paid by the Committee for services
whether presently working for the Committee or not; cancelled checks,
check warrant numbers, time sheets, personnel files, promotion records,
service contracts, payroll disbursement journals, personnel applications
and correspondence, payroll checking accounts, a list of authorized payroll
and bank signatures, all forms filed with federal or state governments on
behalf of employees, including income tax, pension and workmen's compensation forms and reconciliation statements.
(4) Expense account records, including but not limited to vouchers, invoices, expense account reports.
(5) all nonpayroll Committee financial records including but not limited to
ledgers, ledger cards, journals including cash disbursement journals, invoices, purchase orders, vouchers, contracts, accounts payable, check stub
registers, cancelled checks, check warrant numbers, petty cash book, petty
cash vouchers, bank statements, duplicate deposit tickets, bank signature
cards, balance sheets, financial statements, etc.
(6) All correspondence, memoranda, minutes of Committee, executive or
board meetings.
Id
130. The Pennsylvania constitutional provisions are essentially identical to
those in the United States Constitution. Id at 582.
131. 563 F.2d at 580.
132. The major difference in the amended subpoena was that the payroll and
financial records of the Senators on the Committee and their staff members who did
not work for the Committee were excluded. Id at 582.
133. Id at 581.
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to be free from outside interference
legislative duties. '

in the discharge of their

The question of a common law speech or debate privilege for
state legislators has been given three distinct answers. The panel
decision in Craig extended the privilege to state legislators on the
strength of federal common law as formed in Tenney. When reheard
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, that interpretation of Tenney was rejected. The full court, not finding a
federal common law speech or debate privilege, refused to shoulder
the burden of developing the concept in the federal common law. 135
However, the Third Circuit did accept this burden in In Re Grand
Jury Proceedings," ruling that regardless of what Tenney stood for,
the importance of the role of state legislators mandates a common
law speech or debate privilege applicable to them in federal courts.
A close examination of the concurring opinion in Craig, and
Supreme Court decisions interpreting Tenney reveals that the
Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit's reasoning and had
indeed intended to introduce the common law privilege in Tenney.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS -EVIDENCE

OF COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE

Judge Tone's concurring opinion in Craigmentions cases in which
Tenney was cited as reaffirming the notion of official immunity.137
The opinion also notes cases in which Tenney was not discussed
where, logically, it could have been cited if the Supreme Court viewed
Tenney as establishing a common law speech or debate privilege." A close examination of these cases does not reveal convincing
evidence that the Supreme Court views Tenney as a case applying
the doctrine of official immunity to state legislators. Instead, it
becomes clear in the Supreme Court's discussions of Speech or
Debate Clause cases that Tenney is considered one of these cases.
Judge Tone pointed to Wood v. Strickland"' as an example of
an official immunity case which cited Tenney. In that case the Court
had to determine whether the official immunity traditionally
134. Id at 583.
135. United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957, 959 (7th Cir. 1976).
136. 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
137. These cases include: Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); and Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
138. These cases are: Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Jordan v. Hutchenson,
323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 191 F. Supp. 871
(E.D. La. 1961), affd sub nom., Denney v. Bush, 367 U.S. 908 (1960).
139. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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granted to school administrators was applicable under the broad
statutory language of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.14 The reference to
Tenney in this case was to support the proposition that no common
law immunities were overturned by the general language of Section
1983.41 Like Tenney, Wood was merely a case concerning statutory
construction. Tenney was used only as an aid in the statutory construction. Nowhere in the decision did the Court imply that both
legislative privilege and official immunity were identical.
Judge Tone also cited Pierson v. Ray" and Scheuer v.
Rhodes' to support his contention that Tenney is an official immunity case. However, these cases also concerned the statutory construction of Section 1983. Like Wood they merely used Tenney as an
aid in construing the statute.' Judge Tone noted that in Scheuer,
Tenney was cited in the discussion on official immunity, but was not
mentioned in the Court's brief discussion of the Speech or Debate
Clause. However, this omission does not imply that the Court did
not consider Tenney a speech or debate privilege case. The discussion in Scheuer was concerned solely with the privilege of federal
legislators. Discussion of Tenney was naturally omitted because it
was not concerned with federal legislators, but dealt only with the
liability of state legislators. The evidence is thus not convincing that
Tenney has been included with these cases as an example of official
immunity.
O'Shea v. Littleton'4" was mentioned in the concurring opinion
of Craig to support the idea that state legislators are not protected
by any speech or debate privilege. The Supreme Court was quoted
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), provides:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id See notes 80 and 81 supra.
141. 420 U.S. at 316-17.
142. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
143. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
144. 386 U.S. at 554-55; 416 U.S. at 243-44.
145. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). One of the issues in O'Shea was whether the doctrine
of officiAl immunity would protect a judge who violated the constitutional rights of an
individual while in the performance of his judicial duties. The Court ruled that official
immunity did not immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an act of Congress. Id at

503.
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as stating: "We have never held that the performance of the duties
of judicial, legislative, or executive officers requires or contemplates
the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights.""" It appears that Judge Tone may have mistakenly
assumed that the Court was speaking only of the criminal liability of
state legislative officers. This assumption would be valid if all actions of federal legislators in their legislative roles were protected
by the federal Speech or Debate Clause. If such were the case, the
only legislative officers who could be criminally liable for the performance of their duties would be state legislative officers. But this is a
mistaken assumption, for the Court has always left open the question of whether a federal legislator may do something so repulsive
to the rights of a citizen that the Speech or Debate Clause would
not protect him. In Kilbourn v. Thompson "' 7 the Court decided that
"itis not necessary to decide here that there may not be things
done in one House or the other of an extraordinary character for
which the members who take part in the act may be held legally
responsible."' "
The Court in Powell v. McCormack"9 also declined to decide
"whether under the Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be
entitled to maintain this action against the members of Congress
where no agents participated in the challenged action and no other
remedy was available." ' The passage from O'Shea, quoted by Judge
Tone, therefore does not appear to limit criminal liability for such
actions to state legislators. However, it cannot be contended that
federal legislators are not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause
simply because they may be subject to criminal prosecution for extraordinary actions. 5 1 Likewise, the imposition of criminal liability
on state legislators for similarly extraordinary actions cannot
146. Id.(emphasis added).
147. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
148. Id at 204.
149. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause
protected members of Congress from a suit brought against them by Adam Clayton
Powell for his exclusion from the House of Representatives. Although the members
were privileged, the Court held that the House of Representatives was without power
to exclude any person who had been duly elected by the voters of his district and who
was not ineligible to serve under any provision of the Constitution. Id. at 521.
150. Id at 506 n.26.
151. The Supreme Court has been able to reach a compromise solution in many
cases by fashioning relief in which a legislative employee was held liable for his actions
while the legislators who ordered the actions were immune to prosecution because of
the Speech or Debate Clause. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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foreclose the existence of a common law speech or debate privilege
applicable to them.
The concurring opinion in Craig noted three cases which do not
contain any mention of Tenney although they were all instances in
which the Supreme Court issued injunctions against state
legislators.'52 The contention is that if Tenney opened the way for a
common law speech or debate privilege, such a privilege would have
been utilized in these cases. The failure to discuss a speech or
debate privilege could have resulted in two ways. First, the cases
may have been of the extraordinary kind where the only possible
remedy for a serious wrong was such an injunction.' Secondly, and
far more probable, is the possibility that the state legislators did not
raise the privilege for some reason.' u The Court will not raise the
privilege on its own. If the privilege is not seasonably raised by the
defendant it will be deemed waived."'
Contrary to the cases cited by the concurring opinion to
establish that a common law speech or debate privilege was not
established by Tenney, the Supreme Court decisions concerning the
legislative privilege indicate that such a privilege was granted to
the state legislators. The decision in United States v. Johnson,"'
cited Tenney as establishing "the state legislative privilege as being
."'I' It should be
on a parity with the similar federal privilege ...
remembered that Johnson was the first American case in which the
speech or debate privilege was invoked in a criminal context. That
Tenney was viewed as a speech or debate privilege case was made
clear in the Powell decision. '" The Court stated that on four prior
occasions it had been called upon to decide what activities were protected by the speech or debate privilege. Tenney was mentioned as
one of these cases.' 5' Furthermore, the Powell decision agreed with
Tenney that "the clause not only provides a defense on the merits
152. See note 138 supra.
153. If this was the case, the compromise usually available to the Court, see
note 151 supra, could not have been made.
154. The raising of the privilege may indicate to some people that a legislator
has something to hide. To avoid this feeling among the voters, a legislator may waive
the privilege and allow himself to be tried on the merits of the case, hoping for complete vindication without raising a great amount of suspicion among his constituents.
155. E.g., United States v. Pauldino, 487 F.2d 127 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 415
U.S. 981 (1973); United States v. Mooreman, 358 F.2d 31 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 866 (1966).
156. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
157. Id at 180.
158. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
159. Id at 501.
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but also protects a legislator from the burden of defending himself.""' Additional support for Tenney as a speech or debate case
can be found in Dombrowski v. Eastland.' The Court in this case
used Tenney to show that the privilege is limited to those activities
"in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."1 2
Similar interpretations of Tenney have also been made in recent years, despite the narrowing of the Clause by the Supreme
Court. The Gravel decision cited Tenney as extending the privilege
to include committee reports and the voting of legislative
members. 3 As recently as 1975, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,'" the Court grouped Tenney with other speech or
debate privilege cases.6 5 If the words of Tenney concerning the
speech or debate privilege were intended to be mere dicta, it is
highly unlikely that the Court would place such a strong emphasis
on those words in later Speech or Debate Clause cases.
Although Tenney has been cited in some official immunity
cases, it is evident that the Supreme Court has viewed Tenney as
essentially a speech or debate case. Tenney thus may be considered
the federal common law link needed to extend a speech or debate
privilege to state legislators in federal criminal prosecutions under
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, this is at best
a very tenuous link. In cases where there is no federal common law
applicable, or the common law is ambiguous, the federal court must
have some other basis for deciding whether a privilege should be
granted. When a state has a great interest in the outcome of such a
case, the federal court examining state law would be in a better
160. Id. at 502-03.
161. 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The defendants in this case were the Chairman and the
Counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the
United States Senate. The defendants allegedly conspired with state officials to seize
property and records belonging to the plaintiffs. The Court affirmed a lower court ruling giving summary judgment to Senator Eastland, based on the Speech or Debate
Clause. However, the Court remanded the case with respect to the suits brought
against the counsel on the grounds that he was a mere employee of the legislature and
not protected by the Clause. Id. at 85.
162. Id. (cite omitted).
163. 408 U.S. at 625.
164. 421 U.S. 491 (1975). A servicemen's organization brought a suit against
the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, senators, and chief
counsel of the subcommittee to enjoin the enforcement of a subpoena served on a bank
ordering it to produce all records involving an account. The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court ruling and held that the activities of the subcommittee, the individual
senators and the chief counsel fell within the legislative sphere and were protected by
the Speech or Debate Clause.
165. Id. at 502-03.
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position to protect the interests of both the state and federal
governments than if it had no such guidelines.
ADOPTION OF STATE LAW AS A SOLUTION

The solution to the problem of whether there should be a federal
common law privilege for speech or debate for state legislators
should not rest solely upon an interpretation of the Tenney decision.
That case can be viewed as either establishing such a common law
privilege, or alternatively, as reaffirming the doctrine of official immunity. If a court views Tenney as establishing a common law
speech or debate privilege, the privilege will be applicable in federal
courts under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. On the
other hand, if a court interprets Tenney as reaffirming the doctrine
of official immunity, a common law privilege has been neither
granted, nor denied, by the Supreme Court. Assuming that the
federal common law is silent on the matter, some guidelines need to
be established to determine whether a speech or debate privilege
should become a part of the common law.
An examination of the origin of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence'" is helpful in establishing the guidelines. The Rules of
Decision Act 16 7 states that "the laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply."'' In United States v. Reid 6 9 the Supreme Court
interpreted the statute as requiring the federal courts, in criminal
cases, to apply the law of the state in which the trial was held as
that law existed in 1789. If the state had been admitted to the Union
after 1789, the common law as of the date of its admission was con7
trolling.1 70 These principles were struck down in two later cases.1 '
166. See note 4 supra.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
168. Id
169. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363 (1851).
170. See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892).
171. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), addressed the question of
whether, in a federal court, the wife of a defendant on trial for a criminal offense was
a competent witness on behalf of her husband. The Court held that the question should
be decided on the basis of common law and that the common law had a "flexibility and
capacity for growth and adoption." Id. at 383. The Court ruled that the wife was competent to testify on behalf of her husband. Id. at 387.
Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1933), considered whether a written communication between husband and wife was privileged in a criminal prosecution in a
federal court. The Court ruled that it was not bound by state rules of privilege, but
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The new principle established in these cases was flexible and allowed
the federal courts to modify or disregard local laws of privilege "in
light of reason and experience."'

172

The Funk and Wolfle decisions were the foundation of Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 The rule was to be
used to determine the admissibility of evidence without a "search
[of] common law, statutes and constitutional provisions of the
States."'174 The admissibility would be determined by a uniform
federal common law and would not be dependent upon diverse state
laws.
Federal common law was also made the basis for deciding admissibility of evidence under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

75

However,

before

the

form of the

rule

was finally

established, it underwent many changes. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee drafted a series of rules in which nine nonconstitutional privileges were enumerated. 78 Only these privileges
and those required by the Constitution or an Act of Congress were
to be recognized in the federal courts. 177 Congress rejected the
Supreme Court draft because it contained "controversial modifications or restrictions upon the common law privileges.'1 78 In place of
the Supreme Court draft, Congress passed the present Rule 501
was governed by common law principles as "interpreted and applied by the federal
courts in the light of reason and experience." Id. at 12 (cite omitted). According to the
Court, a privilege such as the one involved "suppresses relevant testimony and should
be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence can not otherwise reasonably
be preserved." Id. at 17. Finding no such necessity in this case, the Court disallowed
the privilege. Id.
172. 291 U.S. at 12.
173. See Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
174. H.R. REP. No. 2492, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940).
175. See note 4 supra.
176. The nine enumerated privileges were:
Rule 502: Required Reports
Rule 503: Lawyer-Client Privilege
Rule 504: Physician and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Rule 505: Husband-Wife Privileges
Rule 506: Communications to Clergymen
Rule 507: Political Vote
Rule 508: Trade Secrets
Rule 509: Secrets of State and Other Official Information
Rule 510: Identity of Informers
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-58
(1973).
177. I& at 230.
178. [1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7058.
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which in essence provides that "privileges shall continue to be
developed by courts of the United States under a uniform standard. ' 179 The only criteria set for the courts to decide whether a
privilege was to become a part of the federal common law are the
18
words "in light of reason and experience.""
In the case of a common
law privilege for state legislators, where federal common law is
silent on the privilege, reason and experience may dictate adoption
of state law by the federal courts.18'
There are two prerequisites to a federal court's adoption of
state law.' 82 First, the source of the law applicable to the litigation
must be federal. If the source of the law is federal, the court is not
required to apply state law under the Erie doctrine" or the Rules of
Decision Act.'" Thus, state law, if adopted, would not govern of its
own force, but would nevertheless control, having been incorporated
in the federal common law. 8 5 The source of the law is federal in the
matter of a legislative privilege in a federal criminal prosecution
because the violation of a federal statute is at issue.'" The first
prerequisite to a federal court's adoption of a state speech or debate
privilege is therefore met.
The second prerequisite for the possible adoption of state law
is that Congress must not have determined the choice of law by dictating the use of either federal or state law. Although Congress had
dictated that Rule 501 be applied to determine privileges in federal
courts, the rule itself does not foreclose the adoption of state law.
The federal court may find the state law desirable "in light of
reason and experience" and incorporate it in the federal common
law. If so, the second prerequisite is also satisfied.
Once the prerequisites have been satisfied, three criteria have
been developed by the courts for determining whether state law
179. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
180. See note 4 supra.
181. For a discussion on the availability of the adoption of state law in federal
courts, See Comment, Adopting State Law as the FederalRule of Decision. A Proposed
Test, 43 U. CHICAGO L. REv. 823 (1976).
182. Id. at 824.
183. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie Doctrine provides that the federal courts cannot declare an independent federal common law in
deciding issues which would be governed by state law in state courts. The federal
courts must apply state law in the appropriate cases.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
185. See Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52
(1939); Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 599
(1954).
186. See Comment, note 181 supra, at 825.
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should be adopted. These criteria are the need for uniformity of
laws throughout the country,'87 the presence of an area of traditionally local concern, 88 and the non-existence of a conflict between
state law and federal policies.'89 When these criteria are examined
together in the context of a common law privilege for state
legislators in federal courts, it is clear that the adoption of state law
is a viable alternative.
The first criterion, a need for uniformity in federal laws, is not
a barrier to the adoption of state law for a speech or debate
privilege. The need for uniformity is usually justified to curtail
forum-shopping. 190 Forum shopping, however, is not possible in a
case where a state legislator seeks to apply a state speech or debate
privilege. The law of the state in which the individual is a legislator
would be adopted. Additionally, adoption of state law as the federal
common law may, in itself, promote uniformity. Virtually every state
has granted a speech or debate privilege to its legislators.' The
only differences in the state privileges would be in defining the
scope of the privilege. These differences could be resolved by applying the scope of the federal privilege as interpreted by the Supreme
Court.
The second criterion, presence of a traditionally local concern,
is also met in this situation. The denial of the privilege to state
legislators could severely disrupt the functioning of a state
legislature. 9 2 Intimidation by outside sources could prevent a
legislator from adequately representing his constituents. This would
jeopardize the right of the people of a state to be fairly represented
in the state legislature. Instead of performing his duties in a way
that will best serve his constituents, a legislator may first act in a
manner that protects himself from possible prosecution. The views
represented in the state legislature would then not necessarily be
187.
188.
189.

See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580

(1973).
190. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
191. See note 2 supra.
192. See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 778-79 (1976). The United States
Attorney General admitted at oral argument that the failure to recognize a speech or
debate privilege for state legislators would have an "inhibiting effect on the conduct of
members" of the state legislature. Id at 778. "This threat of the legislature's independence," according to the court, "is fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of
legislative action reflected in the policy, purpose and history of the privilege." Id. at
778-79.
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the views of the people, rather they would be the views of the
source of intimidation. Important local matters should not be determined by a legislator who has been intimidated in this manner.193
Additionally the punishment of a state legislator for improper
conduct in his legislative duties has traditionally been a matter of
"
' Most state legislatures have been granted a right,
local concern.19
through state constitutions, similar to the right granted to the
federal legislature in Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution,"5 to
discipline its members.'" The vesting of the right to discipline
members differs greatly from any right given to the members of the
executive or judicial branches. The right to punish members allows
a legislative privilege broader than official immunity because,
although the legislative acts cannot be questioned in any court, the
members can still be held accountable for improper actions by the
legislature. The broader privilege is necessary in order for the
legislators to exercise their wide discretion in developing laws.
The final criterion is also satisfied because there is no insurmountable conflict between state law and federal policies. Any
substantial conflict between the application of a speech or debate
privilege and the enforcement of federal statutes may be resolved
through a statute which is narrowly drawn to include the prosecution of state legislators.'97 If drafting such a statute is beyond the
power of Congress, a new federal rule of evidence could possibly be
enacted which would exclude the speech or debate privilege for
state legislators in federal courts.99 The fact that Congress has not
193. The court stated that "[d]eterring a legislator from advancing a point of
view, or influencing how he votes by requiring him to explain his motives before a
grand jury is precisely the evil the speech or debate privilege intends to prevent." Id.
at 779. The court based its decision to extend the privilege to state legislators on "the
purpose of the speech or debate privilege, its common law history, and the important
role of the states in governing the country." Id194. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cleveland, 157 Mich. 510, 122 N.W. 284 (1909); In Re
Speakership of the House of Representatives, 15 Colo. 520, 25 P. 707 (1891); Hiss v.
Bartlett, 3 Gray (Mass.) 468 (1855).
195. Article I,§ 5 provides that: "Each House may determine the Rules of its
proceeding, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 par. 2.
196. See e.g., ALAS. CONST. art. II, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9; COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 4; HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. IV, §
6; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 15; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 9; Ky. CONST. § 39; LA. CONST. art.
III, § 7; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
197. This possibility was left open by the Supreme Court in the Tenney decision. 341 U.S. at 376.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976), provides:
The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to
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chosen to enumerate the privileges applicable in federal courts indicates that Congress views privilege law as still in the developmental stages.1"
All three criteria for the adoption of state law regarding the
speech or debate privilege are met. It follows, therefore, that state
law should be adopted "in light of reason and experience." The state
law would not in itself be controlling; rather, it would become a part
of the federal common law. A common law speech or debate
privilege for state legislators could then be applicable in the federal
courts under Rule 501.
CONCLUSION

The common law history of the speech or debate privilege indicates that such a privilege is important to protect legislators from
intimidation from outside sources. This is especially true when the
outside sources are the other branches of the government and the
legislator has fears of possible criminal prosecution and convictions
for acts done in his legislative role. The importance of the privilege
has also been emphasized by Supreme Court decisions which define
the scope of the federal privilege. The decisions indicate that a
legislator's acts, properly classified as "legislative," are privileged
from either civil or criminal liability.
A look at the federal common law as developed in Tenney indicates that a common law speech or debate privilege is applicable
to state legislators in federal courts, yet this is not conclusive. A
resort to the common law interpretations of the Tenney decision inadequately protects the interests of the state and federal governprescribe amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Such amendments shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by
the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session of Congress, but no later than the first day of May and until the expiration of
one hundred and eighty days after they have been so reported; but if
either House of Congress within that time shall by resolution disapprove
any amendment so reported it shall not take effect. The effective date of
any amendment so reported may be deferred by either House of Congress
to a later date or until approved by Act of Congress. Any provision of law
in force at the expiration of such time and in conflict with any such
amendment not disapproved shall be of no further force or effect after
such amendment has taken effect. Any such amendment creating,
abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall have no force or effect unless it
shall be approved by act of Congress.
Id..
199.

H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
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ments in situations where the common law is unclear. Federal Rule
of Evidence 501 provides that the federal common law of privileges
can be developed in the light of reason and experience. The question
of a common law speech or debate privilege for state legislators in
federal courts is one which seems suitable to the adoption of state
law "in light of reason and experience." If state law is adopted it
becomes a part of the federal common law and applicable to state
legislators in federal criminal prosecutions under Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.

Robert J. Palmer
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